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"HIRED GUNS", ADVERSARIES, OR WHITE-COLLAR
KILLERS: COMMENT ON PROFESSORS GREEN'S AND
REDISH'S VIEWS OF TOBACCO LAWYERS
Richard A. Daynard*
For very different purposes, both Professor Green' and Professor
Redish2 assume that the lawyers who worked for American tobacco
companies in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s acted simply as "normal law-
yers" in the roles of legal counselor and legal advocate. Thus charac-
terized, these lawyers then become test cases for the authors' larger
theses. For Professor Green, the issue is the abandonment by the
American Bar Association (ABA) and others of the "wise counselor"
ethic for corporate lawyers ("telling would-be clients they are damned
fools and should stop"). For Professor Redish, the issue is whether
even despised clients are entitled to zealous advocacy.
Professor Green argues that the behavior of lawyers working for
the Brown & Williamson Tobacco Company (B&W), as described in
The Cigarette Papers,3 may come within the outer limits of the "hired
gun" role for corporate lawyers that the ABA has recently espoused. 4
He then suggests that this is a reductio ad absurdum (or, at least, an
intolerable embarrassment) of the ABA's position.5 Professor Redish
takes a very different tack, constructing an abstract and elaborate de-
fense of the position of the adversary in law and politics, and then
defending the lawyers' behavior by assuming hypothetically that it has
not overstepped the proper bounds of this role.6 I believe that to
make his case, Professor Green underplays the lawyers' misdeeds;
whereas Professor Redish's benign hypotheses about the lawyers' be-
havior are contradicted by the facts.
* Professor of Law, Northeastern University School of Law.
1. Bruce A. Green, Thoughts about Corporate Lawyers after Reading The Cigarette Papers:
Has the "Wise Counselor" given way to the "Hired Gun"?, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 407 (2001).
2. Martin H. Redish, The Adversary System, Democratic Theory and the Constitutional Role of
Self-Interest: The Tobacco Wars, 1953-1971, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 359 (2001).
3. STANTON A. GLANTZ ET AL., THE CIGARETrE PAPERS (1996).
4. See Laborers in Different Vineyards? The Banking Regulators and the Legal Profession,
Report by the ABA Working Group on Lawyers' Representation of Regulated Clients (Discus-
sion Draft Jan. 1993).
5. Green, supra note 1, at 422.
6. Redish, supra note 2.
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Professor Green begins his analysis of the tobacco lawyers' by stat-
ing that "[t]hey assisted their client's efforts to prevent the public dis-
semination of unfavorable scientific studies, in part, by adopting an
extreme position concerning the law governing the attorney-client
privilege."'7 I think a fair reading of the documents cited in the rele-
vant section of The Cigarette Papers is that the B&W attorneys cre-
ated a fraudulent attorney-client and work product cover for scientific
research by channeling the smoking and health research that was be-
ing sent to B&W by its parent company for ordinary business reasons
through the law department.8 This was not a matter of aggressive,
pushing-the-envelope, legal advocacy, but of outright fraud that cre-
ated a fake paper record to protect discoverable documents from dis-
covery. Nor do I think Professor Green gets very far with his
suggestion that the fake records are legally innocent because privilege
claims based on them were not made during the time period covered
by the book.9 The privilege claims were indeed made later 10 and, in
any event, equipping your client with bogus documents in order to
enable it to complete the fraud at a later time hardly seems excusable.
Professor Green goes so far as to suggest that even B&W's own
conduct may not be fraudulent and, perhaps, not even tortious
(though terribly immoral).1 But not only has it been found to be
both fraudulent and otherwise tortious by the jury in the Engle class
action case, 12 the entire text of The Cigarette Papers is an elaborately
documented story of fraud, fraudulent concealment, failure to warn,
and various other torts.' 3 Whether the relationship between morality
and current views of legal ethics is as orthogonal as Professor Green
suggests, the link with morality has not been broken in tort law. Lying
to your customers about the deadly dangers of your product is still
tortious.1 4 And, as The Cigarette Papers demonstrates throughout, the
B&W lawyers were actively involved in crafting the company's lies
and keeping employees of the company and its affiliates "on
message."15
7. Green, supra note 1, at 425.
8. GLANTZ, supra note 3.
9. Green, supra note 1, at 427.
10. See Michael Ciresi et al., Decades of Deceit: Document Discovery in the Minnesota To-
bacco Litigation, 25 WM. MIrCHELL L. REV. 477, 509 (1999).
11. Green, supra note 1, at 426.
12. Engle v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, t4.3 TPLR 2.101 (1999).
13. GLANTZ, supra note 3.
14. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 526 (1977).
15. GLANTZ, supra note 3.
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One argument in Professor Green's article seems inconsistent with
his overall thesis. He claims that "[n]ot only did the tobacco industry
lawyers' conduct accord generally with the contemporary conception
of the corporate lawyer's role, but that conception has become so
prevalent that many lawyers today may be unable to contemplate the
alternative. ' 16 He illustrates the point with a hypothetical conversa-
tion between a tobacco lawyer and a tobacco executive, during which
the lawyer attempts to give "wise counselor" advice by urging his cli-
ent to tell its customers that tobacco is lethal and addictive, and per-
haps to get out of the business entirely. 17 He is correct in thinking
that the advice would probably not be taken very well, but goes so far
as to suggest that an attorney giving such advice, much less a client
following it, is simply "unimaginable." 18
Besides undermining his thesis that we should go back to the "wise
counselor" model (if it is unimaginable, how can we go back to it?),
this argument ignores a real event chronicled in The Cigarette Papers.
On July 17, 1963, B&W's Vice President and General Counsel, Addi-
son Yeaman, wrote a memorandum in which the most famous line was
"We are, then, in the business of selling nicotine, an addictive drug
.... ,"19 The purpose of this frankness apparently was to support
Yeaman's proposals that the industry should support health warnings
on cigarette packages and genuinely objective research into smoking
and health, and that the companies should compete in developing and
marketing a genuinely safer cigarette. 20 While his suggestions were
not accepted, they were not absurd either. In the "wise counselor"
mode, Yeaman was urging his client to take the long view, putting up
with reduced sales and greater liability exposure in the short term, in
exchange for reestablishing the industry on a solid, ethical, and, in the
long run, more legally defensible posture.
Professor Redish's article, on the other hand, takes me back to my
college "Introduction to Logic" class, where we studied propositions
of the following form: If the moon is made of green cheese, then one
equals two. Professor Redish drops a footnote at the beginning of his
analysis stating, "I will confine my analysis to a set of purely hypothet-
ical contingencies of conceivable versions of attorney behavior during
that time period. ' 21 It turns out that under the rules of formal logic, if
16. Green, supra note 1, at 427.
17. Id. at 427-28.
18. Id.
19. GLANTZ, supra note 3, at 74.
20. GLANTZ, supra note 3, at 52-56, 72-74.
21. Redish, supra note 2, at 360 n.1.
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the assumption is false, then anything at all logically follows ... in-
cluding Professor Redish's hypothetical conclusion that the behavior
of the tobacco lawyers (from 1953-1971, roughly the same period cov-
ered by The Cigarette Papers) was legally and ethically blameless.
In theory, Professor Redish's article is all theory, and, while I do not
agree with all his theorizing, I will not discuss it. Unfortunately, I can-
not end my Commentary with that observation because when he fi-
nally discusses the implications of adversary theory and constitutional
democracy for the evaluation of the tobacco lawyers' behavior, Pro-
fessor Redish discusses "facts" and does so in a way that I think is
seriously misleading. He states that
in their capacity as adversaries acting in anticipation of legal con-
flict, industry lawyers could appropriately choose to support only
those research efforts that they reasonably believed might lead to
scientific data or conclusions supporting their client's position on
the potentially outcome-determinative scientific issue. The fact that
tobacco lawyers selectively supported research with this self-inter-
ested agenda in mind would have been wholly consistent with the
tenets of the adversary system, adversary theory, and liberal
democracy. 22
This statement is filled with truisms, but is misleading in context. In-
dustry lawyers could indeed properly do this "in their capacity as ad-
versaries. '"23 But they could not properly do that in their capacity as
managers of the tobacco industry's overall research effort on smoking
and health issues because (1) companies have a common law obliga-
tion to research the actual dangers of the products they sell (and take
appropriate action to protect their customers based on what the objec-
tive research shows), and (2).cigarette companies specifically assumed
such an obligation in their famous "Frank Statement to Cigarette
Smokers," published in hundreds of newspapers in January 1954.24
There is no doubt that they functioned in the managerial capacity, as
well as in the adversarial one. As one 1978 Lorillard document put it,
"We have again 'abdicated' the scientific research directional manage-
ment of the Industry to the 'Lawyers' with virtually no involvement on
the part of the scientific or business management side of the busi-
ness."'25 This echoes a 1964 report by British tobacco industry repre-
sentatives who had visited their counterparts in the United States that
"[tihe leadership [of the scientific research enterprise] in the U.S....
lies with the powerful policy committee of senior lawyers advising the
22. Redish, supra note 2, at 396.
23. Id.
24. GLANTZ, supra note 3, at 34.
25. See Ciresi, supra note 10, at 631.
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industry, and their policy, very understandably, in effect is 'don't take
any chances." 26
Professor Redish actually commends as "a form of true legal bril-
liance" the way in which the industry purported to fulfill "its obliga-
tion under governing tort law to sponsor or conduct reasonable
investigations concerning the scientific properties of its product. '2 7
The notion was that the industry would fund the Council for Tobacco
Research (CTR).2 8 "The industry itself, then, did not choose the re-
search to be supported." 29 If the results favored the industry, it could
trumpet them; if they came out the other way, it could trash them.30
The problem is that there are three false assumptions embedded in
the previous paragraph. First, CTR did not "conduct reasonable in-
vestigations concerning the scientific properties" of cigarettes.31
"CTR was meant to serve primarily a public relations function and...
CTR scientific research was of little value in addressing issues relating
to the causal link between smoking and health. '32 In fact, the compa-
nies in the industry, in flagrant violation of the anti-trust laws as well
as of their tort law obligations, created a secret "gentlemen's agree-
ment" not to conduct in-house biological research. 33 Thus, they met
their research obligations neither in-house nor through the "brilliant"
device of CTR. Second, the industry did choose the research to be
supported! For example, potentially "dangerous" proposals to CTR
were vetted by a tobacco industry law firm, with those that might doc-
ument serious health problems being diverted from the funding mech-
anism.34 Finally, a policy of challenging all adverse results hardly
meets the industry's tort obligation to protect their customers
(through disclosure or product modification) where objective research
demonstrates serious dangers.
Professor Redish speaks harshly about lawyers who help perpetrate
fraud.35 If the tobacco lawyers did that, he would have no problem
with them. "Absent proof of such fraudulent behavior, however, '36
26. Id.
27. Redish, supra note 2, at 399-400.
28. Id. at 400.
29. Id. at 399.
30. Id. at 400 (noting that, "the industry would remain free to challenge the validity of those
results where it deemed it appropriate to do so").
31. Id. at 400.
32. See Ciresi, supra note 10, at 541 (quoting the Report of the Special Master in the Minne-
sota tobacco litigation).
33. Id. at 551-53.
34. Id. at 563-64.
35. Redish, supra note 2, at 402.
36. Id. at 402.
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their conduct is unobjectionable, perhaps even admirable. The prob-
lem is that there is proof of such fraudulent behavior. For example,
while he acknowledges the possibility
that industry lawyers or scientists could seek to modify the contract
researcher's results or methodology in a fraudulent manner by seek-
ing to falsely alter findings.... [T]he mere expression of interest in
the correctness of the contract researcher's methods or conclusions
does not, in and of itself, violate ethical limitations.37
I have followed tobacco litigation for many years, and I have never
heard a scientist complain about an expression of interest in her meth-
ods or conclusions by a tobacco industry representative. As Judge
Sarokin noted in his opinion during the Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
Inc. trial, "At least one scientist testified as to threats made to him if
he published his findings, and there was other evidence of attempts to
suppress or coerce others. '38
Similarly, after a long riff on the right of the tobacco industry to
maintain an unpopular position on scientific issues and on the mod-
esty appropriate for a lawyer in subordinating his judgment on such
issues to that of his client, Professor Redish concludes that "where
lawyers have personal knowledge of undisputed facts that contradict
the arguments that they are making on behalf of their client . . . [,]
continued attempts to make those arguments do exceed the scope of
the tenets of adversary theory. ' 39 While I guess it is conceivable that
lawyers of "true legal brilliance" who are charged with managing the
tobacco industry's entire smoking and health research effort, might
have missed the fact-undisputed by any knowledgeable scientist not
in the employ of the tobacco industry-that smoking causes cancer
and other fatal diseases, in fact, it did not happen that way. B&W
General Counsel Addison Yeaman, in the same 1963 memorandum
discussed earlier, concluded, "At the best, the probabilities are that
some combination of constituents of smoke will be found conducive to
the onset of cancer or to create an environment in which cancer is
more like to occur."'40 Indeed, a memorandum prepared in the 1980s
by R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company's (RJR) outside counsel dates the
knowledge of RJR's General Counsel Henry Ramm, ten years earlier:
"In approximately 1953, Dr. Claude Teague reviewed the smoking and
health literature and was surprised by the volume of material which
'indicted' cigarette smoking .... According to Dr. Teague, the Law
37. Id.
38. 683 F. Supp. 1487, 1491 (D. N.J. 1988).
39. Redish, supra note 2, at 405.
40. GLANTZ, supra note 3, at 53.
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Department advised that this report should not be circulated ... [h]e
advised that the report be collected and destroyed."'41
Professor Redish concludes with a passionate plea not "to exempt
the tobacco industry from the process-based protections of the Consti-
tution on the grounds of its moral reprehensibility .... "42 1 would add
my own plea not to exempt the tobacco industry or its lawyers from
accountability in tort to their victims on the slippery grounds ad-
vanced by Professor Redish.
41. Ciresi, supra note 10, at 559.
42. Redish, supra note 2, at 406.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:449
